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Abstract
Which labor market specification is better able to describe inflation dynamics, a widely-
used sticky wage model or a recently-investigated labor market search model? Using a
Bayesian likelihood approach, we estimate these two models with Japan’s data. This paper
shows that the labor market search model is superior to the sticky wage model in terms
of both marginal likelihood and out-of-sample forecast performance, particularly regarding
inflation. The labor market search model is better able to replicate the cross-correlation
among inflation, real wages, and output in the data. Moreover, in this model, real marginal
cost is determined by both hiring cost and unit labor cost that varies with employment
fluctuations, which gives rise to a high contemporaneous correlation between inflation and
real marginal cost as represented in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. (JEL E24, E32,
E37)
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1 INTRODUCTION
Inflation dynamics have been investigated using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models with sticky prices. In the models, inflation is determined by the New Keynesian Phillips
curve (NKPC), where real marginal cost of producing output is the main driving force and varies
with changes in labor cost. Therefore, the specification of the labor market plays a crucial role
in describing inflation dynamics.
Many previous studies use sticky wage models (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005; Levin et al.,
2006; Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007). In this specification of the labor market, workers set
wages on a staggered basis a` la Calvo (1983) while firms employ all workers and adjust labor
input by changing hours per worker (i.e., intensive margin of labor). Consequently, the cost
involved to adjust employment is absent in sticky wage models.
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the role of the extensive margin of labor
(i.e., employment) for inflation dynamics. Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), and Trigari
(2009), for instance, incorporate sticky prices in a labor market search model that has been
analyzed in the literature starting from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Merz (1995), and
Andolfatto (1996).1 In this labor market specification, firms adjust labor input by changing
employment while wages are determined through bargaining between workers and firms. These
characteristics of the labor market differ radically from those in sticky wage models. Despite
this fundamental difference, existing literature lacks the formal comparison of sticky wage
models and labor market search models.
The present paper fills this gap. Specifically, we estimate a sticky wage model and a labor
market search model with Japan’s data using a Bayesian likelihood approach, and compare
these two models in terms of marginal likelihood and out-of-sample forecast performance.
The estimation results show that the labor market search model is superior to the sticky
wage model in terms of both marginal likelihood and out-of-sample forecast performance, par-
ticularly regarding inflation. Why is the former model better able to fit the data and forecast
inflation? Because the non-labor market part is identical between these two models, the key
difference is the relationship between real wages and inflation or output. In the sticky wage
1For recent studies on inflation dynamics using labor market search models, see also Christoffel et al. (2006),
Christoffel and Kuester (2008), Christoffel and Linzert (2010), Krause et al. (2008), Sveen and Weinke (2008),
Ravenna and Walsh (2008), Gertler et al. (2008), Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010), and Van Zandweghe (2010).
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model, real wages are highly correlated with output in the presence of monopolistically compet-
itive labor markets, and unit labor cost under full employment is identical with real marginal
cost and thus drives inflation dynamics. However, the cross-correlation between real wages and
output in the data is not so high as in the sticky wage model. Besides, the data of real wages
and output determine the unit labor cost, which lags far behind inflation by more than three
years whereas a high contemporaneous correlation between inflation and real marginal cost is
represented in the NKPC. In the labor market search model, labor bargaining generates a mild
cross-correlation between real wages and output. Moreover, real marginal cost is determined
by both hiring cost and unit labor cost that varies with employment fluctuations, which gives
rise to a high contemporaneous correlation between inflation and real marginal cost. Therefore,
the labor market search model is better able to fit the data and forecast inflation.
In related literature, Rabanal and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2005) show that a sticky wage model
matches U.S. data far better in terms of marginal likelihood than a flexible wage model.
Christoffel et al. (2006), Gertler et al. (2008), and Krause et al. (2008) estimate a labor market
search model with U.S. or Euro area data. To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to
compare a sticky wage model and a labor market search model in terms of marginal likelihood
and out-of-sample forecast performance.
As for related studies on Japan, Muto (2009) stresses that the measurement of real marginal
cost plays a crucial role in estimating the NKPC and shows that the consideration of labor
market frictions greatly improves the goodness of its fit to Japan’s data, in line with our result
that introducing labor market search and matching frictions improves marginal likelihood.
Braun et al. (2006) indicate the business cycle fact that the intensive margin plays a more
important role in Japan’s labor input fluctuations than the extensive margin. This is consistent
with our result that the extensive margin may be more important for inflation dynamics in
Japan. Labor input adjustment at the extensive margin is very costly for firms in Japan and
therefore fluctuations in hours per worker are better able to explain labor input fluctuations.
For inflation dynamics, real marginal cost is the key factor and hence the costly adjustment at
the extensive margin has a crucial influence on the dynamics.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a sticky wage model and
a labor market search model. Section 3 explains data and econometric methods for estimating
these models. Section 4 shows estimation results. Section 5 conducts robustness exercises.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3
2 TWO LABOR MARKET MODELS
This section presents a sticky wage model and a labor market search model. First, the common
part of these two models is explained. Then, the part specific to each model is described. Note
that all variables without time subscript denote steady-state values and all hatted variables
represent the log-deviations from steady-state values.
2.1 Common Part of Two Models
The sticky wage model and the labor market search model contain the following common part,
which describes households’ spending behavior, firms’ price-setting behavior, and a central
bank’s monetary policy.2
Under complete insurance markets, households maximize CRRA utility functions of final-
good consumption with internal habit formation. The log-linearized first-order conditions for
consumption and bond holdings, together with the final-good market clearing condition,3 yield
λˆt =
1
1− βχ
{
−
σ
C
1− χ
(Yˆt − χYˆt−1) + εut − βχ
[
−
σ
C
1− χ
(EtYˆt+1 − χYˆt) + Etεut+1
]}
, (1)
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 + Rˆt − Etpˆit+1, (2)
where λt is the marginal utility of consumption, Yt is output, Rt is the gross nominal interest
rate, pit is the gross inflation rate, εut is a preference shock that follows a stationary first-order
autoregression process, Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available in
period t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, σ
C
> 0 is the degree of relative risk
aversion, and χ ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of habit persistence in consumption preferences.
There are a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate-good firms and per-
fectly competitive final-good firms. The intermediate-good firms produce differentiated goods
by a Cobb-Douglas production technology using labor input and a fixed capital stock that is
identical among firms, and set prices of these goods on the Calvo (1983)-style staggered basis
with indexation to recent past inflation and steady-state inflation. The final-good firms com-
bine differentiated intermediate goods into homogenous goods by a CES production technology
2For the derivation of the common part of the sticky wage model and the labor market search model, see the
appendix, which is available upon request to the authors.
3Each model assumes that there is no other demand for final goods than consumption. Thus, the final-good
market clearing condition shows that output supply matches consumption demand.
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and sell them to households. Consequently, the inflation rate is determined by the NKPC
pˆit =
γp
1 + βγp
pˆit−1 +
β
1 + βγp
Etpˆit+1 +
(1− ξp)(1− βξp)
ξp(1 + βγp)[1 + θp(1− α)/α]
(mˆct + εpt), (3)
where mct is an “average” of real marginal cost (Gal´ı et al., 2001), εpt is a price markup shock
that follows a stationary first-order autoregression process, ξp ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of not
reoptimizing prices, γp ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of price indexation to recent past inflation relative
to steady-state inflation, θp > 1 is the steady-state price elasticity of demand for differentiated
goods, and α ∈ (0, 1] is the labor input elasticity of output in the Cobb-Douglas production
technology.
Monetary policy is conducted by following a Taylor (1993)-type interest rate rule
Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(φpipˆit + φY Yˆt) + εRt, (4)
where εRt is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock, φR ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of interest rate smoothing,
and φpi, φY ≥ 0 are the degrees of policy responses to inflation and output.
2.2 Sticky Wage Model
In addition to the common part, the sticky wage model supposes that households supply dif-
ferentiated labor services to intermediate-good firms and set wages on the Calvo (1983)-style
staggered basis with indexation to steady-state inflation while the firms employ all workers and
use a CES aggregate of the labor services as labor input.
In the model, log-linearized equilibrium conditions are given by Equations (1)–(4) and4
Yˆt = αhˆt + εat, (5)
mˆct = wˆt − Yˆt, (6)
wˆt = zˆt + hˆt, (7)
pˆiwt = βEtpˆi
w
t+1 +
(1− ξw)(1− βξw)
ξw(1 + θwσh)
(σhhˆt − λˆt − zˆt + εwt), (8)
pˆiwt = zˆt − zˆt−1 + pˆit, (9)
where ht is labor hours per worker, wt is real wages per worker, zt is the real wage rate per
worker, piwt is the gross nominal wage inflation rate, εat and εwt are a productivity shock and
4For the derivation of log-linearized equilibrium conditions in the sticky wage model, see the appendix, which
is available upon request to the authors.
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a wage markup shock that follow univariate stationary first-order autoregression processes,
σh ≥ 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply, ξw ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of not
reoptimizing wages, and θw > 1 is the steady-state wage elasticity of demand for differentiated
labor services. Equation (5) is the Cobb-Douglas production technology explained above,
Equation (6) represents firms’ cost minimization with respect to labor input and shows that
real marginal cost is identical with unit labor cost under full employment (wˆt−Yˆt), Equation (8)
describes households’ staggered wage setting, and Equations (7) and (9) give the definitions of
the real wage and the nominal wage inflation rate.
2.3 Labor Market Search Model
Next turn to the labor market search model. As in Trigari (2009), employment intermediaries
are introduced so that they make a decision on employment while intermediate-good firms
adopt the above-mentioned Calvo-style staggered price setting. Each intermediary employs
workers and supplies a package of their labor services to intermediate-good firms, which produce
differentiated goods by the above-mentioned Cobb-Douglas production technology using labor
packages Nt as labor input. Thus, as is similar to Equation (5), the production technology is
represented by
Yˆt = αNˆt + εat. (10)
Letting Zt denote the real rental rate of labor packages, firms’ cost minimization with respect
to labor packages leads to
mˆct = Zˆt + Nˆt − Yˆt, (11)
as is similar to Equations (6) and (7).
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions. At the beginning of
period t, nt−1 workers are hired by employment intermediaries, but a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) of
these workers leaves jobs and enters the pool of job searchers. Then, letting the population
size be normalized to unity, the measure of job searchers is given by
ut = 1− (1− ρ)nt−1. (12)
Employment intermediaries post vt vacancies. As a consequence, mt job searchers are newly
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hired according to the constant returns to scale matching technology
mt = ξmu
ξ
tv
1−ξ
t , (13)
where ξm > 0 is the matching productivity and ξ ∈ (0, 1) is the search elasticity of new hire.
As in Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2010), it is assumed that
new hires become productive instantaneously. Thus, the measure of workers supplying labor
services in period t is given by
nt = (1 − ρ)nt−1 + mt. (14)
As in Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) and Gertler et al. (2008), there is a hiring cost instead
of a vacancy posting cost typically used in literature on labor market search (e.g., Pissarides,
2000). Hiring is costly, depending on the tightness of the labor market. As in the literature,
this tightness is measured by the ratio of vacancies to job searchers,
xt ≡
vt
ut
. (15)
Thus, the labor market tightness rises with vacancies vt but declines when the measure of job
searchers ut increases. Employment intermediaries need γxtmt existing workers to recruit mt
new hires. Therefore, the hiring cost is opportunity cost of these workers, who would engage
in production if there were no new hire.
Employment intermediaries use a linear technology, which produces ht(nt − γxtmt) units
of labor packages. The intermediaries then maximize profit
Et
∞∑
j=0
βt,t+j [Zt+jht+j (nt+j − γxt+jmt+j)− zt+jht+jnt+j ]
subject to Equations (12)–(15), where βt,t+j = β
jλt+j/λt is the stochastic discount factor.
Letting Jt be the Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion of employment (14), the first-order
conditions for profit maximization with respect to nt and xt are given by
Ztht = ztht + Jt − (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1
[
γξmZt+1ht+1x
2−ξ
t+1 + Jt+1
(
1− ξmx
1−ξ
t+1
)]
,
Jt = γξxtZtht, (16)
where γξ = γ(2 − ξ)/(1 − ξ). Note that the multiplier Jt represents the marginal value of
employment in terms of final goods. Combining these yields
Ztht = ztht + γξxtZtht − (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1γξxt+1Zt+1ht+1
(
1−
ξm
2− ξ
x1−ξt+1
)
. (17)
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The real wage rate per worker zt and labor hours per worker ht are determined by Nash
bargaining through which a joint surplus from employment is split between employment inter-
mediaries and employed workers. Then, asset values of employed and unemployed workers, Vt
and Vut, are given by
Vt = ztht −
χhh
1+σh
t
λt(1 + σh)
+ Et βt,t+1 {[1− ρ(1− put+1)]Vt+1 + ρ(1− put+1)Vut+1} ,
Vut = b + Et βt,t+1 [put+1Vt+1 + (1− put+1)Vut+1] ,
where χh > 0 is a scale parameter for labor disutility relative to consumption utility, put =
mt/ut is the job finding rate, and b = bww = bwzh is the flow value of unemployment in terms
of final goods, which includes unemployment benefits as well as other factors such as home
production, and bw ∈ (0, 1) is the ratio of this unemployment value to the steady-state real
wage. Combining the asset values yields
Vt − Vut = ztht −
χhh
1+σh
t
λt(1 + σh)
− b + (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1(1− put+1)(Vt+1 − Vut+1), (18)
which represents workers’ net surplus from employment. Then, the real wage rate zt and labor
hours ht are chosen so as to maximize (Vt − Vut)
ηt (Jt)
1−ηt , where ηt = η exp(εηt)/[1 − η +
η exp(εηt)] ∈ (0, 1) denotes workers’ share of the joint surplus and εηt is a labor bargaining
shock that follows a stationary first-order autoregression process.5
The first-order conditions for the wage rate and labor hours lead to
Vt − Vut =
ηt
1− ηt
Jt, (19)
χhh
σh
t
λt
= Zt. (20)
Equation (19) implies that Vt − Vut = ηtSt and Jt = (1 − ηt)St, where St = (Vt − Vut) + Jt is
the joint surplus, and hence ηt indeed shows workers’ share. From Equations (16), (18), and
(19), the real wage is determined as
wt = ztht
= b +
χhh
1+σh
t
λt(1 + σh)
+
ηt
1− ηt
γξxtZtht
− (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1γξxt+1Zt+1ht+1
(
1− ξmx
1−ξ
t+1
) ηt+1
1− ηt+1
. (21)
5The specification of workers’ share of the joint surplus has three properties: (i) ηt → 0 as εηt → −∞, (ii)
ηt → 1 as εηt →∞, and (iii) ηt = η when εηt = 0.
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Combining this and Equation (17), we have
wt = ηt
{
Ztht + (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1γξxt+1Zt+1ht+1
[
1−
ξm
2− ξ
x1−ξt+1 −
(
1− ξmx
1−ξ
t+1
)ηt+1(1− ηt)
ηt(1− ηt+1)
]}
+ (1− ηt)
[
b +
χhh
1+σh
t
λt(1 + σh)
]
.
Hence, employed workers are compensated for a fraction ηt of employment intermediaries’
earnings and savings on future hiring cost and for the remaining fraction 1− ηt of the sum of
the flow values of unemployment and labor disutility.
In the labor market search model, log-linearized equilibrium conditions consist of not only
Equations (1)–(4), (10), and (11) but also log-linearization of Equations (12)–(15), (17), (20),
(21), and the resource constraint for labor packages6
Nt = ht(nt − γxtmt). (22)
Combining Equation (11) and log-linearization of Equations (17), (21), and (22) leads to
mˆct = wˆt − Yˆt + nˆt −
(
1−
z
Z
)
zˆt −
(
1−
hn
N
)
(nˆt − mˆt − xˆt)
+ γξx(xˆt + Zˆt)− γξxβ(1− ρ)(1− ξmx
1−ξ)Etxˆt+1
− γξxβ(1− ρ)
(
1−
ξmx
1−ξ
2− ξ
)
(Etλˆt+1 − λˆt + EtZˆt+1 + Ethˆt+1 − hˆt). (23)
This shows that in the labor market search model, real marginal cost mˆct is determined by not
only unit labor cost (wˆt − Yˆt + nˆt) but also other factors that stem from hiring cost. This real
marginal cost differs radically from the one (6) in the sticky wage model, where the extensive
margin of labor (i.e., employment) is absent. Therefore, if the labor market search model shows
a better empirical performance than the sticky wage model, the terms related to the extensive
margin are important driving forces of real marginal cost and hence inflation.
3 DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODS
Using a Bayesian likelihood approach, this paper estimates the sticky wage model and the labor
market search model with Japan’s four quarterly time series as observable variables: pit, Rt, Yt,
wt. The data on pit is the inflation rate of the seasonally adjusted CPI excluding fresh foods,
6The log-linearization of these equations is given by Equations (22)–(25) and (36)–(40) of the working-paper
version of this paper (Ichiue et al., 2008), where Wt (but not Zt) denotes the real rental rate of labor packages.
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and the effects of changes in the VAT rate on this inflation rate are adjusted. The data on Rt
is the overnight call rate. For Yt and wt, this paper uses real GDP per potential labor force and
real wage per worker that are detrended by potential GDP per potential labor force. These
potential variables are elements used by the Bank of Japan to estimate the output gap (see
Hara et al., 2006), and hence the data on Yt is completely consistent with the Bank’s estimates
of the output gap. The real wage is the sum of employee income and net mixed income deflated
by the CPI.7 The observation equations are given by

100 log pit
100 log Rt
Yt
100∆ log wt


=


p¯i/4
(r¯ + p¯i)/4
0
0


+


pˆit
Rˆt
Yˆt
wˆt − wˆt−1


,
where p¯i and r¯ are the annualized rates of inflation and real interest at the steady state.
In line with Sugo and Ueda (2008), the sample period is from 1981:1Q to 1995:4Q. The end
of the sample period follows from the fact that our estimation strategy is not able to take into
account the effects of the non-linearity in monetary policy rules that stems from the zero lower
bound on the nominal interest rate.
Most parameters of each model are estimated, but some parameters are fixed or calculated
from steady-state conditions to avoid an identification issue. In each model, this paper chooses
the labor input elasticity of output in the Cobb-Douglas production technology at α = 0.63
and the steady-state price elasticity of demand for differentiated goods at θp = 6, which implies
a steady-state price markup of 20%. The discount factor β is determined by the steady-state
real interest rate r¯. In the sticky wage model, the steady-state wage elasticity of demand for
differentiated labor services is set at θw = 6, implying a steady-state wage markup of 20%.
In the labor market search model, the present paper chooses the steady-state unemployment
rate at 1 − n = 0.025, the job separation rate at ρ = 0.049, and the quarterly capital-output
ratio at ky = 1.24 × 4 = 4.96.
8 Moreover, the matching productivity and the search elasticity
7This paper does not use data on labor hours per worker. This is because there is no data on labor hours of
all workers including the self-employed. Note also that even for employed workers, labor hours may be poorly
measured due to the presence of unreported labor hours.
8The value of 1−n = 0.025 is the sample period mean of the rate of unemployment given by subtracting the
number of workers from the number of potential labor force used by the Bank of Japan. The value of ρ = 0.049
is the sample period mean of the seasonally adjusted job separation rate (industries covered, establishments with
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of new hire are set at the estimates of Ishizaki and Kato (2003), ξm = 0.8 and ξ = 0.47. The
remaining parameters and steady-state values are calculated from steady-state conditions.9
Prior distributions of model parameters to be estimated are shown in Table 1. For the
common parameters (i.e., σ
C
, χ, ξp, γp, φR , φpi, φY , p¯i, r¯, ρa, ρu, ρp, σa, σu, σR , σp), prior
distributions are identical between the two models. These distributions and those of the other
parameters in the sticky wage model (i.e., σh, ξw, ρw, σw) are chosen based on previous studies
that estimate sticky wage models, such as Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), Levin et al. (2006),
Iiboshi et al. (2006), and Sugo and Ueda (2008). For the remaining parameters in the labor
market search model (i.e., η, bw, ρη, ση, χh, γ), prior distributions are set based on recent
studies that estimate labor market search models, such as Christoffel et al. (2006), Gertler et
al. (2008), and Krause et al. (2008).
As in recent studies that take a Bayesian likelihood approach to estimate a DSGE model,
this paper uses the Kalman filter to evaluate the likelihood function of each model and applies
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate draws from a posterior distribution of model
parameters.10 Based on these draws, the present paper makes inference on the parameters and
obtains the Kalman smoothed estimates of unobservables.
4 ESTIMATION RESULTS
This section presents estimation results. We first show parameter estimates and then compare
the sticky wage model and the labor market search model.
4.1 Parameter Estimates
For each parameter, Table 2 reports the posterior mean and the 90% HPD (Highest Posterior
Density) interval.11 The estimates of the common parameters are similar between the sticky
30 employees or more) in the Monthly Labour Survey. Moreover, the value of ky = 4.96 is the sample period
mean of the GDP ratio of the capital stock in the Japan Industrial Productivity (JIP) Database.
9See the working-paper version of this paper (Ichiue et al., 2008) for the steady-state relationships used in
the estimation of the labor market search model.
10In each estimation, 200,000 draws are generated and the first half of them is discarded. The scale factor for
the jumping distribution in the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is adjusted so that an acceptance rate of 24% is
obtained. The Brooks and Gelman (1998) measure is used to check the convergence of model parameters.
11In the sticky wage model, the scale parameter for labor disutility χh disappears in log-linearizing the model.
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wage model and the labor market search model. Moreover, most of the estimates are comparable
to those in Iiboshi et al. (2006) and Sugo and Ueda (2008), who estimate a sticky wage model
with Japan’s data, although our estimates of habit persistence χ are larger than theirs (i.e.,
0.64 in Iiboshi et al., 0.10 in Sugo and Ueda) while our estimates of price indexation to lagged
inflation γp are smaller than theirs (i.e., 0.61 in Iiboshi et al., 0.86 in Sugo and Ueda).
As for the labor market parameters, our estimates of the inverse elasticity of labor supply
σh and the probability of not reoptimizing wages ξw are similar to those in Iiboshi et al. (2006)
(i.e., 2.43 and 0.37) and Sugo and Ueda (2008) (i.e., 2.15 and 0.52). Our estimate of the
steady-state worker share of η = 0.50 is comparable to the estimate of 0.58 in the case of
period-by-period labor bargaining in Gertler et al. (2008), who estimate a labor market search
model with U.S. data. Yet our estimate of the ratio of the flow value of unemployment to wages
of bw = 0.82 is smaller than theirs (i.e., 0.98).
4.2 Model Comparison
Next turn to the comparison of the sticky wage model and the labor market search model in
terms of marginal likelihood and out-of-sample forecast performance.
Table 3 reports the marginal likelihood of each model. This table shows that the labor
market search model is superior to the sticky wage model in terms of marginal likelihood. The
log of Bayes factor (i.e., the difference in log of marginal likelihood) in favor of the former
model relative to the latter is 10.17 (= −277.36 − (−287.53)). According to Jefferys (1961),
this value constitutes “decisive evidence” in favor of the labor market search model, because it
is larger than 4.61 (= log 100).
As for the out-of-sample forecast performance of each model, Table 4 reports the root mean
squared errors in the forecast of the four data series (100 log pit, 100 log Rt, Yt, 100∆ log wt)
for different forecast horizons over the period from 1991:1Q to 1995:4Q. The overall forecast
performance is measured by the log determinant of the uncentered forecast error covariance
matrix. For this exercise, each model was initially estimated over the period from 1981:1Q
to 1990:4Q, and then the estimated model was used to forecast the four series from 1991:1Q
to 1995:4Q. In this way each model was reestimated over the period until 1991:4Q, 1992:4Q,
1993:4Q, or 1994:4Q. Table 4 demonstrates that, for most of the forecast horizons, the overall
forecast performance is better (i.e., the log determinant is smaller) in the labor market search
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model than in the sticky wage model. Moreover, the root mean squared errors in the out-of-
sample forecast of the CPI inflation rate (100 log pit) and the overnight call rate (100 log Rt) are
smaller in the labor market search model for most of the forecast horizons.
In sum, the labor market search model is superior to the sticky wage model in terms of both
marginal likelihood and out-of-sample forecast performance, partcularly regarding inflation.
4.3 Why is Labor Market Search Model Better Able to Fit Data and Fore-
cast Inflation?
In this subsection, we address the question of why the labor market search model fits the data
and forecast inflation better than the sticky wage model. Because the non-labor market part
is identical between these two models, the key difference is the relationship between real wages
and inflation or output.
In the sticky wage model, real wages are highly correlated with output in the presence of
monopolistically competitive labor markets. Besides, unit labor cost under full employment is
identical with real marginal cost, which is the main driving force of inflation dynamics as can
be seen in the NKPC (3).
Figure 1 illustrates the cross-correlation between real wages and output or inflation in the
data and its 90% HPD interval in each model. The cross-correlation between real wages and
output in the data, however, is not so high as in the sticky wage model. Moreover, Equation (6)
shows that unit labor cost in the sticky wage model is determined by the data of real wages and
output, and this cost lags far behind inflation by more than three years as shown in Figure 2.
This fact is hard to replicate by the NKPC (3).
In the labor market search model, labor bargaining determines real wages as in Equa-
tion (21), which gives rise to a mild cross-correlation between real wages and output as can
be seen in Figure 1. Moreover, as in Equation (23), real marginal cost is determined by both
hiring cost and unit labor cost that varies with fluctuations in employment. This generates a
high contemporaneous correlation between inflation and real marginal cost as represented in
the NKPC (3). Therefore, the labor market search model fits the data and forecasts inflation
better than the sticky wage model.
The estimation results presented above are consistent with the results of previous studies
on Japan’s economy. Muto (2009) stresses that the measurement of real marginal cost plays a
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crucial role in estimating the NKPC and shows that the consideration of labor market frictions
improves the goodness of its fit to Japan’s data. Our estimation results show that introducing
labor market search and matching frictions improves marginal likelihood. Braun et al. (2006)
indicate the business cycle fact that the intensive margin plays a more important role in Japan’s
labor input fluctuations than the extensive margin. This is consistent with our result that the
extensive margin may be more important for inflation dynamics in Japan, because labor input
adjustment at the extensive margin is very costly for firms in Japan. Therefore, fluctuations
in hours per worker are better able to explain labor input fluctuations. For inflation dynamics,
real marginal cost is the key factor and hence the costly adjustment at the extensive margin
has a crucial influence on the dynamics.12
5 ROBUSTNESS EXERCISES
This section evaluates the robustness of the results mentioned above. The present paper con-
ducts the following two robustness exercises. The first exercise estimates an associated labor
market search model without the intensive margin of labor and examines whether the labor
market search model is superior to the sticky wage model even in the absence of the intensive
margin. The second exercise estimates the labor market search model (with both the margins)
using data on the unemployment rate additionally and compares it with the sticky wage model.
5.1 Labor Market Search Model without Intensive Margin
So far the labor market search model has allowed for labor input adjustment at the intensive
margin in addition to the extensive margin. The presence of the intensive margin may help the
labor market search model fit the data and forecast inflation better than the sticky wage model.
Thus, we estimate an associated labor market search model without the intensive margin and
compare it with the sticky wage model in terms of marginal likelihood and out-of-sample
forecast performance.
12A similar argument can be applied to the U.S. economy. Braun et al. (2006) indicate that in U.S. the
extensive margin plays a more important role in labor input fluctuations, which may imply that labor input
adjustment at the extensive margin is less costly and has a minor influence on inflation dynamics. In fact, when
our two models are estimated with the U.S. data provided in Smets and Wouters (2007), it is shown that the
sticky wage model is superior to the labor market search model in terms of marginal likelihood.
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In the absence of the intensive margin, the labor market search model is modified in the
following three respects.
First, employment intermediaries now maximize profit
Et
∞∑
j=0
βt,t+j [Wt+j (nt+j − γxt+jmt+j)− wt+jnt+j ]
subject to Equations (12)–(15), where Wt is the real price of labor packages. The first-order
conditions for profit maximization with respect to nt and xt are given by
Wt = wt + Jt − (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1
[
γξmWt+1x
2−ξ
t+1 + Jt+1
(
1− ξmx
1−ξ
t+1
)]
,
Jt = γξxtWt. (24)
Combining these yields
Wt = wt + γξxtWt − (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1γξxt+1Wt+1
(
1−
ξm
2− ξ
x1−ξt+1
)
. (25)
Second, only the real wage is determined via bargaining between employment intermediaries
and employed workers. The asset value of employed workers is now given by
Vt = wt + Et βt,t+1 {[1− ρ(1− put+1)]Vt+1 + ρ(1− put+1)Vut+1} .
Hence, the difference between the asset values of employed and unemployed workers is
Vt − Vut = wt − b + (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1(1− put+1)(Vt+1 − Vut+1), (26)
where the flow value of unemployment b now additionally includes labor disutility. From (19),
(24), and (26), the wage is determined as
wt = b +
ηt
1− ηt
γξxtWt − (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1
(
1− ξmx
1−ξ
t+1
) ηt+1
1− ηt+1
γξxt+1Wt+1. (27)
Combining this and Equation (25), we have
wt = ηt
{
Wt + (1− ρ)Et βt,t+1γξxt+1Wt+1
[
1−
ξm
2− ξ
x1−ξt+1 −
(
1− ξmx
1−ξ
t+1
)ηt+1(1− ηt)
ηt(1− ηt+1)
]}
+ (1− ηt) b.
Last, the resource constraint for labor packages is now given by
Nt = nt − γxtmt. (28)
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Consequently, in the labor market search model without the intensive margin, log-linearized
equilibrium conditions consist of not only Equations (1)–(4), (10), and (11) but also log-
linearization of Equations (12)–(15), (25), (27), and (28).13 These equilibrium conditions are
estimated using the same data and the same econometric methods as presented above.
The second and third columns of Table 5 report the posterior mean and the 90% HPD
interval for each parameter.14 The parameter estimates are similar to those in the presence of
the intensive margin presented in the last two columns of Table 2, although the estimated ratio
of the flow value of unemployment to wages, bw = 0.99, is higher in line with the estimate of
Gertler et al. (2008) in the case of period-by-period labor bargaining (i.e., 0.98).15 This reflects
the inclusion of labor disutility in the flow value of unemployment.
Table 3 shows that the labor market search model with no intensive margin is superior to
the sticky wage model in terms of marginal likelihood. The log of Bayes factor in favor of
the former model relative to the latter is 6.95 (= −280.58 − (−287.53)). This value is larger
than 4.61 (= log 100) and hence, according to Jefferys (1961), it constitutes “decisive evidence”
in favor of the labor market search model without the intensive margin. As illustrated in
Figure 3.a and b, the labor market search model with no intensive margin generates the 90%
HPD intervals that contain the cross-correlation between real wages and output and between
real wages and inflation in the data. Hence, the labor market search model fits the data better
than the sticky wage model even in the absence of the intensive margin. Moreover, we can see
that embedding the intensive margin makes the labor market search model fit the data better.
The log of Bayes factor of 3.22 (= −277.36−(−280.58)) is larger than 2.30 (= log 10) and hence
constitutes “strong evidence” in favor of the presence of the intensive margin.
As for the out-of-sample forecast performance, the second to fifth columns of Table 6 report
the root mean squared errors in the forecast of the four data series (100 log pit, 100 log Rt, Yt,
100∆ log wt) for different forecast horizons over the period from 1991:1Q to 1995:4Q. The
forecast performance of the labor market search model in the absence of the intensive margin
13The log-linearization of these equations is given by Equations (22)–(28) of the working-paper version of this
paper (Ichiue et al., 2008).
14In the labor market search model with no intensive margin, the scale parameter for hiring cost γ is calculated
from steady-state conditions. See the working-paper version of this paper (Ichiue et al., 2008).
15Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue that the flow value of unemployment needs to be close to wages in
order for the labor market search framework to replicate the actual movements in U.S. real wages.
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shown in the third to tenth rows of Table 6 is similar to that in the presence of the intensive
margin presented in the last eight rows of Table 4. This suggests that the labor market search
model without the intensive margin is superior to the sticky wage model in terms of out-of-
sample forecast performance, particularly regarding inflation.16
5.2 Labor Market Search Model Estimated with Unemployment Rate Data
The preceding subsection has confirmed the robustness of the result in terms of model speci-
fication. In this subsection we examine the robustness in terms of data. Because the data on
the unemployment rate can be constructed from the time series of the numbers of workers and
potential labor force used in building the data on output and real wages, we address the ques-
tion of whether the labor market search model is superior to the sticky wage model when it is
estimated using the unemployment rate data additionally. The comparison of these two models
in terms of marginal likelihood is not possible, since the data set is now different between the
models due to the absence of unemployment in the sticky wage model. Thus, out-of-sample
forecast performance is compared.
As in Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010), the observation equation for the unemployment rate at
the end of period t, Ut = 1− nt, is given by
100Ut = U¯ − (1− U)nˆt,
where U¯ = 100U = 100(1−n) is the steady-state unemployment rate, which is set at the same
value as used above, i.e., U¯ = 2.5.
With the five data series (100 log pit, 100 log Rt, Yt, 100∆ log wt, 100Ut) and the same econo-
metric methods as presented above, the labor market search model is estimated. The last two
columns of Table 5 report the posterior mean and the 90% HPD interval for each parameter.
Most of the estimates are similar to those in no use of the unemployment rate data shown in
the last two columns of Table 2, although the estimated ratio of the flow value of umployment
to wages of bw = 0.75 and the estimate of the bargaining shock persistence of ρη = 0.83 are
smaller while the estimate of the technology shock persistence of ρa = 0.86 is larger.
16Figure 3.c illustrates that the contemporaneous correlation between inflation and real marginal cost is high
in the labor market search model with no intensive margin. Hence, the labor market search model forecasts
inflation better than the sticky wage model even in the absence of the intensive margin.
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The out-of-sample forecast performance is presented in the last eight rows of Table 6.
Even when the labor market search model is estimated using the unemployment rate data
additionally, the overall forecast performance is still better than that in the sticky wage model.
Moreover, the root mean squared errors in the out-of-sample forecast of the CPI inflation rate
(100 log pit) are also smaller for most of the forecast horizons.
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6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has estimated a sticky wage model and a labor market search model with Japan’s
data using a Bayesian likelihood approach and has examined which labor market specification
is better able to describe inflation dynamics. The estimation results have shown that the
labor market search model is superior to the sticky wage model in terms of both marginal
likelihood and out-of-sample forecast performance, particularly regarding inflation. Compared
to the sticky wage model, the labor market search model is better able to replicate the cross-
correlation among inflation, real wages, and output in the data. Moreover, real marginal
cost in the latter model is determined by both hiring cost and unit labor cost that varies
with employment fluctuations, which generates a high contemporaneous correlation between
inflation and real marginal cost as represented in the NKPC.
This paper follows previous studies such as Rabanal and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2005) to assume
that there is no investment spending. Future work will extend the present analysis so that
investment spending is incorporated in the two models. A preliminary estimation result shows
that the result of the present paper still holds in the extended models.
17Even when the unemployment rate data is additionally used in the model estimation, Figure 3.c illustrates
that the contemporaneous correlation between inflation and real marginal cost is still high in the labor market
search model, which yields a better performance regarding out-of-sample inflation forecast than that in the sticky
wage model.
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Table 1: Prior distribution of each model parameter
Parameter Distribution Mean 90% interval
Common parameters
σ
C
relative risk aversion Gamma 2.00 [0.68, 3.88]
χ consumption habit persistence Beta 0.60 [0.25, 0.90]
ξp probability of not reoptimizing prices Beta 0.50 [0.17, 0.83]
γp price indexation to past inflation Beta 0.50 [0.17, 0.83]
φ
R
interest rate smoothing Beta 0.75 [0.57, 0.90]
φpi policy response to inflation Normal 1.50 [1.17, 1.83]
φ
Y
policy response to output Normal 0.50 [0.17, 0.83]
p¯i annualized steady-state inflation rate Normal 1.00 [-0.64, 2.64]
r¯ annualized steady-state real interest rate Normal 2.00 [0.36, 3.64]
ρa persistence of productivity shock Beta 0.50 [0.25, 0.75]
ρu persistence of preference shock Beta 0.50 [0.25, 0.75]
ρp persistence of price markup shock Beta 0.60 [0.34, 0.83]
σa s.d. of productivity shock innovation Inv. gamma 0.50 [0.11, 1.41]
σu s.d. of preference shock innovation Inv. gamma 5.00 [1.05, 14.1]
σ
R
s.d. of monetary policy shock Inv. gamma 0.50 [0.11, 1.41]
σp s.d. of price markup shock innovation Inv. gamma 5.00 [1.05, 14.1]
Labor market parameters
σh inverse of elasticity of labor supply Gamma 2.00 [0.68, 3.88]
ξw probability of not reoptimizing wages Beta 0.40 [0.10, 0.75]
ρw persistence of wage markup shock Beta 0.60 [0.34, 0.83]
σw s.d. of price markup shock innovation Inv. gamma 5.00 [1.05, 14.1]
η steady-state worker share in labor bargaining Beta 0.50 [0.17, 0.83]
bw flow-value-of-unemployment wage ratio Beta 0.75 [0.50, 1.00]
ρη persistence of labor bargaining shock Beta 0.75 [0.47, 0.95]
ση s.d. of labor bargaining shock innovation Inv. gamma 20.0 [4.22, 56.3]
χh scale parameter for labor disutility Gamma 0.10 [0.03, 0.19]
γ scale parameter for hiring cost Gamma 0.05 [0.02, 0.10]
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Table 2: Posterior distribution of model parameters
Sticky wage Labor market search
Mean 90% HPD interval Mean 90% HPD interval
σ
C
1.64 [0.41, 2.73] 1.90 [0.42, 3.36]
χ 0.90 [0.80, 0.98] 0.86 [0.77, 0.96]
ξp 0.72 [0.66, 0.79] 0.73 [0.65, 0.80]
γp 0.17 [0.03, 0.30] 0.20 [0.03, 0.36]
φ
R
0.85 [0.80, 0.90] 0.83 [0.78, 0.89]
φpi 1.49 [1.19, 1.79] 1.49 [1.23, 1.77]
φ
Y
0.16 [0.06, 0.25] 0.16 [0.08, 0.24]
p¯i 1.67 [0.84, 2.59] 1.78 [0.97, 2.63]
r¯ 2.49 [1.71, 3.26] 2.61 [1.90, 3.30]
ρa 0.41 [0.18, 0.65] 0.37 [0.15, 0.57]
ρu 0.60 [0.38, 0.82] 0.57 [0.37, 0.77]
ρp 0.77 [0.65, 0.90] 0.68 [0.53, 0.85]
σa 0.52 [0.40, 0.65] 0.54 [0.28, 0.76]
σu 10.9 [3.13, 19.4] 8.58 [2.47, 14.7]
σ
R
0.14 [0.11, 0.16] 0.14 [0.12, 0.16]
σp 3.10 [1.34, 4.84] 4.25 [1.80, 6.38]
σh 1.87 [0.70, 2.89] 2.55 [1.10, 3.87]
ξw 0.54 [0.36, 0.74] – –
ρw 0.82 [0.73, 0.93] – –
σw 7.35 [1.90, 13.0] – –
η – – 0.50 [0.26, 0.75]
bw – – 0.82 [0.71, 0.94]
ρη – – 0.96 [0.93, 0.99]
ση – – 33.3 [17.0, 50.5]
χh – – 0.10 [0.02, 0.17]
γ – – 0.04 [0.01, 0.08]
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Table 3: Marginal likelihood of each model
Model Log marginal likelihood
Sticky wage -287.53
Labor market search -277.36
Labor market search (no intensive margin) -280.58
Note: The marginal likelihood is computed based on the Geweke (1999) modified harmonic mean estimator.
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Table 4: Out-of-sample forecast performance of each model
Sticky wage
Quarter 100 log pit 100 log Rt Yt 100∆ log wt Overall
1 0.927 0.545 0.404 1.145 -4.145
2 1.036 0.989 0.716 1.154 -1.515
3 1.006 1.417 0.997 1.125 0.422
4 1.265 1.766 1.290 1.150 0.510
5 1.305 2.061 1.529 1.188 1.265
6 1.325 2.370 1.795 1.223 1.869
7 1.328 2.567 2.038 1.182 1.337
8 1.331 2.788 2.228 1.230 1.404
Labor market search
Quarter 100 log pit 100 log Rt Yt 100∆ log wt Overall
1 0.886 0.522 0.419 1.068 -4.351
2 0.974 0.908 0.770 1.171 -1.589
3 1.023 1.264 1.097 1.133 0.237
4 1.207 1.530 1.410 1.144 0.603
5 1.248 1.743 1.675 1.199 1.264
6 1.238 1.977 1.951 1.228 1.701
7 1.112 2.134 2.194 1.185 1.013
8 1.097 2.318 2.388 1.228 1.010
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Table 5: Posterior distribution of model parameters: robustness exercises
No intensive margin Unemployment rate data
Mean 90% HPD interval Mean 90% HPD interval
σ
C
1.69 [0.47, 2.83] 1.74 [0.44, 2.92]
χ 0.86 [0.74, 0.96] 0.87 [0.81, 0.95]
ξp 0.81 [0.76, 0.86] 0.75 [0.69, 0.81]
γp 0.17 [0.03, 0.30] 0.22 [0.05, 0.38]
φ
R
0.88 [0.82, 0.93] 0.83 [0.78, 0.88]
φpi 1.48 [1.19, 1.79] 1.57 [1.29, 1.86]
φ
Y
0.24 [0.10, 0.39] 0.09 [0.01, 0.18]
p¯i 1.73 [0.86, 2.61] 1.67 [1.01, 2.34]
r¯ 2.28 [1.33, 3.20] 2.75 [2.05, 3.41]
ρa 0.44 [0.21, 0.66] 0.86 [0.80, 0.92]
ρu 0.62 [0.43, 0.82] 0.56 [0.37, 0.72]
ρp 0.67 [0.49, 0.83] 0.64 [0.45, 0.84]
σa 0.53 [0.27, 0.82] 0.63 [0.48, 0.76]
σu 7.90 [2.64, 13.8] 7.86 [3.14, 12.6]
σ
R
0.13 [0.11, 0.15] 0.14 [0.12, 0.16]
σp 7.98 [2.70, 13.4] 5.81 [2.56, 8.60]
σh – – 1.53 [0.70, 2.25]
η 0.56 [0.28, 0.83] 0.56 [0.33, 0.81]
bw 0.99 [0.98, 0.99] 0.75 [0.64, 0.86]
ρη 0.94 [0.90, 0.98] 0.83 [0.74, 0.93]
ση 48.7 [28.0, 70.9] 22.8 [14.8, 29.9]
χh – – 0.10 [0.02, 0.17]
γ – – 0.08 [0.03, 0.12]
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Table 6: Out-of-sample forecast performance: robustness exercises
No intensive margin
Quarter 100 log pit 100 log Rt Yt 100∆ log wt Overall
1 0.883 0.510 0.430 1.115 -4.354
2 0.933 0.910 0.809 1.172 -1.293
3 0.859 1.279 1.163 1.146 -0.222
4 1.053 1.556 1.483 1.156 1.008
5 1.034 1.760 1.746 1.206 1.456
6 1.001 1.980 2.021 1.234 1.734
7 0.899 2.134 2.257 1.187 1.376
8 0.894 2.313 2.457 1.233 1.192
Unemployment rate data
Quarter 100 log pit 100 log Rt Yt 100∆ log wt Overall
1 0.877 0.560 0.408 1.112 -4.329
2 0.978 1.016 0.733 1.199 -1.744
3 0.956 1.456 1.030 1.180 -0.660
4 1.208 1.823 1.320 1.160 0.162
5 1.253 2.139 1.564 1.211 0.943
6 1.288 2.465 1.828 1.237 1.566
7 1.294 2.692 2.061 1.190 0.800
8 1.345 2.933 2.246 1.224 1.022
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Figure 1: Cross-correlation between real wages and output or inflation
a. cross-correlation between real wages and output
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b. cross-correlation between real wages and inflation
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Note: The solid line shows the correlation between output or inflation in period t and real wages in period t+ k,
k = 0,±1, . . . ,±6 in the data and the dashed line shows the model-implied 90% HPD interval.
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Figure 2: Cross-correlation between inflation and real marginal cost
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Note: This figure shows the correlation between inflation in period t and real marginal cost in period t + k,
k = 0,±1, . . . ,±15.
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Figure 3: Cross-correlation in labor market search model: robustness exercises
a. cross-correlation between real wages and output: no intensive margin
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
-0.5
0
0.5
1
b. cross-correlation between real wages and inflation: no intensive margin
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c. cross-correlation between inflation and real marginal cost
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
 
 
No intensive margin
Unemployment rate data
Notes: In Panels a and b, the solid line shows the correlation between output or inflation in period t and real
wages in period t + k, k = 0,±1, . . . ,±6 in the data and the dashed line shows the model-implied 90% HPD
interval. Panel c shows the correlation between inflation in period t and real marginal cost in period t + k,
k = 0,±1, . . . ,±15.
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